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Label Grocery Products—United States v. Topco Associates. 1—
Topco Associates is a cooperative corporation wholly owned and
controlled by some 25 small and medium-sized supermarket chains
operating stores in 33 states.' Topco's sole function is to serve as a
cooperative buying organization through which its members can pur-
chase at relatively low prices over 1000 different items, most of which
are sold under brand names owned by Topco. The principal purpose
of the Topco organization is to provide its members with an effective
and cost competitive private label program so as to enable the individ-
ual members to compete effectively with the national and large regional
chains. Most memberships in the association are exclusive' and possess
the sole right to sell Topco controlled brands and Topco provided
products in the geographic territory defined in the membership agree-
ment. The government sought an injunction against Topco to prevent it
from limiting or restricting the territories within which its members
might sell Topco brands and products. The government contended that
this practice constituted a division of the market among competitors,
and was, therefore, a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
Topco defended on the grounds that a private label program is neces-
sary to enable a small chain to compete effectively against national
chains, and that the successful operation of such a program requires
a division of the market among the respective participating members.
It further argued that any limitations on competition among Topco
members were far outweighed by the increase in competition in the
overall supermarket field. The District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois HELD: The defendant's practice of allocating territories
within which its members have the exclusive right to sell Topco private
label products is not a per se violation of the Sherman Act. The court
further held that the territorial limitations on memberships are neces-
sary to enable defendant's members to compete effectively with the
national food chains, and that the limitations on competition among
1 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
2
 The members do not conduct business under the "Topco" name. Each succeeds or
fails as a separate entity. Star Markets, Giant Food, Inc. and Hill's Korvette Super-
markets are three of the more well known chains belonging to the association. 319 F.
Supp. at 1033.
In some cases, co-extensive and non-exclusive licenses have been granted for par-
ticular territories, but since at least in some cases these territories have been large enough
for more than one licensee to operate without actually competing, even these licenses have
tended to be de facto exclusive. .319 F. Supp, at 1042.
4
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), provides in part: "Every
contract, combination in the form o f trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of




Topco members are, on balance, reasonable and not violative of the
antitrust laws.
The division of territory by competitors, a practice early and
seemingly categorically condemned as a per se unlawful trade re-
straint,° continues to reappear in new forms. ° The creation of a buying
cooperative with each member having a closed territory illustrates
this development. Equally persistent, the government continues to
challenge such variations as mere disguises of the condemned parctice.
The results of the ensuing litigation have not always been uniform 7
and the holdings have left room for speculation.° The instant case
provides no exception to this pattern. It is the purpose of this note,
first, to examine the Topco decision in light of the decisional and
statutory underpinnings of the defense of "reasonableness." The note
will then attempt to answer the question of why the Topco court
reached this defense in light of the generally accepted proposition that
the horizontal division of a market is per se illegal. Finally, this note
will point out possible weaknesses in the "necessity" argument made
by Topco and adopted by the court, examine the court's designation
of the relevant product market, and explore the potential for price
fixing by the Topco members.
The court's conclusion that Topco's market division practices were
not violative of the Sherman Act was based upon an application of the
"rule of reason."' This approach was first adopted in Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 1° which held that the Sherman Act prohibits only
5 See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Timken Roller Bear-
ing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) ; and United States v, Addvston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See also Report of the
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, at 26 (1955).
In addition to the territorial restraints in the instant case, the courts have had to
deal with divisions of market incident to a plan of trademark licensing, United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), and a vertically imposed division of the market result-
ing from the allocation of exclusive distributorships by a manufacturer, United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
7 See Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964), upholding the restrictions,
and United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), striking down the re-
strictions.
8 See discussion of United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), and Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847
(6th Cir. 1964), infra. See also Rudnick, The Sealy Case: The Supreme Court Applies
The Per Se Doctrine To a Hybrid Distribution System for Trademarked Bedding Prod-
ucts, 57 Trademark Rep. 459 (1967) ; see also McLaren, Territorial and Customer Re-
strictions, Consignments, Suggested Resale Prices and Refusals To Deal, 37 ABA Antitrust
L. J. 137 (1968).
° The rule of reason had its origins in the common law ancillary restraints doctrine
which provided that a trade restraint "ancillary" to the main purpose of a business trans-
action was valid if the restraint was reasonable and necessary. For a comprehensive survey
of common law ancillary restraints cases, see United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
10 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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undue restraints of the trade.' Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States12 applied the rule of reason to a situation where the restraints
would perhaps strengthen the overall competitive nature of the in-
dustry. If a restraint is found to be devoid of any positive competitive
benefits, it is characterized as illegal per se and condemned without
further inquiry into its reasonableness.° As for the criteria to be con-
sidered in judging the reasonableness of a restraint, Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States" held that the court must ordinarily consider
all facts "peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied.. ..” 1 °
The peculiar facts of the food merchandising industry in general,
and of private label programs in particular, played a decisive role in
the court's analysis of Topco's territorial restrictions." The super-
market industry is characterized by the dominance of large national
food chains which tend to set the competitive pace." Recently, there
has been a marked concentration of economic resources and retail
outlets among a few powerful national and large regional chains, while
independent grocers and smaller chains, such as those belonging to the
Topco association, have disappeared at an accelerating rate." A signifi-
cant factor in these developments has been the ability of the larger
chains to establish and maintain private label programs." Once a chain
establishes with its customers an acceptance of its private label pro-
ducts, it enjoys a customer loyalty which no competitor can exploit
since no chain sells its private label products to competitors. 2° Thus, if
a customer believes that Ann Page or Sultana products are the best
buys for the money, he must shop at an A&P food store, since only
that chain carries those private label products. Those chains without
private label programs are limited to competing in those brands which
are available to all supermarkets, and thus cannot benefit from private
label customer loyalty.
Since a major factor in the acceptance of private label products
11 Id, at 60.
12 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
18 See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
14 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
18 The Court said:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind,
to strain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business
to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The his-
tory of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the par-
ticular remedy, the purpose or end to be attained are all relevant facts.
246 U.S. at 238.
10 See the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, 319 F. Supp. at 1032-038.
17 319 F. Supp. at 1034.
18 Id.
18 Id. at 1035.
20 Id. at 1039-040.
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is their low prices,2' only those firms that are large enough to take
advantage of the economies of high-volume buying can successfully
utilize a private label program. There was evidence produced in the
Topco case that an annual sales volume of $500 million was required
to support such a program with optimum economic efficiency.22 In
view of the fact that the largest Topco member had a sales volume of
only $182.8 million," it is clear that individually the Topco members
would be unable to avail themselves of the benefits of a private label
program. The chains solved this problem by combining to form a
cooperative that would mass purchase' products for all of the members
from manufacturers and processors. The economies thus achieved
allowed the individual members to price their private label products
at relatively low price levels. Nevertheless, the members still faced the
problem of convincing the consumer that their private label products
were the best buys, quality-wise, for the money. An extensive advertis-
ing and promotional campaign, if successful, would develop desired
customer acceptance of these products, but would not give the chains
the type of customer loyalty enjoyed by the national chains in the
operation of their own programs. This was so because, unlike those of
the national chains, the Topco private label products were not the
exclusive products of any one chain. Since each member of the associa-
tion could obtain Topco products, any one chain would be in a position
to let an associate member bear the costs of advertising and promotion
in a particular area, and then move in to reap the benefits of that
member's promotional campaign. Realizing that this possibility sig-
nificantly detracted from the value of a private label program," the
chains found it necessary to insure that the respective members of the
association would not engage in such practices. This was accomplished
by the assignment of exclusive territories to each member, within which
only one member could sell Topco private label products. Having thus
arranged to receive the benefits of both mass procurement and exclusive
customer loyalty, the individual Topco members found themselves on
a competitive plane with their national competitors. The only signifi-
cant differences between the two were the manner in which the exclu-
sivity was obtained and the size of the area in which the exclusivity
applied. While the national chains' exclusivity resulted from their
status as single, integrated chains, that of the Topco chain stemmed
from its exclusive right to sell Topco products in a specified territory.
Similarly, while the national chains' exclusivity gave them a monopoly
in their private label products in the entire nation, that of the Topco
chain provided it with a comparable monopoly only in a certain terri-
tory. The fact that the national chains had a legal monopoly in their
private label products, combined with the particular nature of the
21 Id. at 1035.
22 Id. at 1036.
22 Id. at 1033.
24 Id. at 1036.
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supermarket industry, no doubt influenced the court in its analysis of
the reasonableness of Topco's practices.
To the extent that the territorial restrictions are a necessary part
of the private label program," they can be said to be responsible for
the benefits that result from such a program. The private label program
enables Topco members to compete more effectively with the dominant
national chains, and thus lessens the oligopolistic nature of the super-
market industry." The Topco program provides the customer with
another choice of high-quality, low-priced merchandise. Further, the
program benefits the small manufacturers and processors which are
the principal sources of private label products?' These small manu-
facturers are generally unable to develop national brand name recogni-
tion for their products. Thus, they benefit from the Topco private
label program by the assurance of a subtantial market for their prod-
ucts and by having the Topco members sustain the costs and risks
of product and label development, promotion and marketing. Thus,
the Topco arrangement served to strengthen the overall competitive
nature of the industry. 28
The court found that these results were obtained with no signifi-
cant lessening of competition.20 It noted that the territories were only
as large as a member could adequately serve," thus insuring that the
public would have the benefits of the Topco chain's overall competition.
It also observed that the restrictions did not preclude member chains
from selling non-Topco products outside their territories. 21 If one
considers that non-Topco products accounted for 94 percent of the
members' average sales," it can be seen that there remained room for
significant competition among members. Somewhat related to this point
was the finding that in any case, the average market share of the Topco
members was only 5.87 percent," thus indicating that regardless of the
Topco practices, there was other substantial competition within the
various markets. Finally, the court observed that the restraints were
of a non-permanent duration; membership was not static, but changed
frequently as new, smaller members entered and old, larger members
25 See discussion of the necessity for the restraints at pp. 1244-45 infra.
26
 In 1967, the 25 largest supermarket chains accounted for 85.6% of total super-
market chain sales. 319 F. Supp. at 1034. The combined retail sales of Topco's member
chains totaled $2.3 billion, placing it fourth in total sales behind the big three of the in-
dustry—A&P, Safeway and Kroger. 319 F. Supp. at 1033. The resulting argument in favor
of upholding the validity of Topco's practices is that an industry with 4 leaders is less
oligopolistic than one with only three. Of course, Topco Associates is not a single chain
and thus cannot accurately be compared to the "big three," but the comparison does in-
dicate the relative strengths of a single Topco member and a single A&P store in a given
territory.
27 319 F. Supp. at 1035.
28 See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
28 319 F. Supp. at 1038.
80 Id. at 1036.
81
 Id. at 1037. The significance of this accessibility is discussed at p. 1251 infra.
82




left to carry on their own private label programs." Viewed in that
light, the Topco arrangement, rather than being a restrictive organiza-
tion dedicated to the preservation of a monopoly, was instead a means
by which smaller chains could grow in strength to assume a competitive
position in the industry.
In summary, it seems evident that significant pro-competitive re-
sults were accomplished in the overall industry. Given the facts that
characterize the supermarket industry and the particular benefits and
requirements of a private label program, the court appears to have been
justified in finding that Topco's market division practices were reasona-
ble."
The question arises, however, whether the court should ever have
reached the issue of reasonableness. The court seems to conclude that
Topco market divisions are not per se illegal because they are reason-
able. This analysis defeats the purpose of the per se rule. The principal
purpose of a per se rule is precisely to preclude inquiry into the reason-
ableness issue. The government had reason to believe that the per se
illegality of a market division among competitors had long been set-
tled." Although the court in Topco did not explain its departure from
the per se rule, there appear to be several ways its decision can be
reconciled with past cases.
In United States v. Sealy, Inc.," the Supreme Court found a per
se violation on facts somewhat similar to Topco. There was language
in the decision, however, that appears. to open the door to exceptions
to a strict application of the per se rule in market division cases. The
defendant in Sealy was a corporation that owned the Sealy tradename
and licensed small manufacturers throughout the country to make
Sealy bedding products. Like Topco, however, Sealy was owned and
controlled by its licensees, thus making the organization horizontal
in nature. Besides providing central advertising, promotion, technical
and managerial assistance and research, Sealy worked with the licensees
to set retail prices. Finally, it served as a device whereby each manu-
facturer could maintain an exclusive territory in which to sell its prod-
84 Id, at 1038.
88 The court said:
The Topco licensing provisions are not inherently unreasonable and have no sub-
stantial adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. They are ancillary
and subordinate to the fulfillment of the legitimate, procompetitive purpose of
the Topco cooperative, reasonable and in the public interest.
319 F. Supp. at 1038.
80 See cases cited in note 5 supra. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
Judge Learned Hand wrote:
It is settled, at least as to { 1, that there are same contracts restricting com-
petition which are unlawful, no matter how beneficient they may be; no indus-
trial exigency wilrjustify them; they are absolutely forbidden. Chief Justice Taft
said as much of contracts dividing a territory among producers . . . [in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291 (6th Cir. 1898)].
148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
37 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
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uct. Sealy licensed only one manufacturer to make and sell Sealy
products in a particular area. In return, each manufacturer agreed not
to make or sell outside its area. The district court issued a decree en-
joining the price-fixing practice, but upheld the agreements to allocate
territory on the ground that they were ancillary to a lawful plan of
trademark licensing and, therefore, reasonable." On an appeal limited
to the market division issue, the Supreme Court reversed, and held that
the territorial arrangements were per se illegal. Significantly, however,
the Court did not rely exclusively upon the readily available and sup-
posedly well established rule that a horizontal division of a market
among competitors is per se illegal. Instead, the Court reasoned that
the Sealy territorial division should be found per se unreasonable
because it was part of a per se unreasonable plan of price-fixing:
[The] existence and impact of the practice [of price-fixing]
cannot be ignored in our appraisal of the territorial limita-
tions. . . . It may be true, as appellee vigorously argues, that
territorial exclusivity served many other purposes. But its
connection with the unlawful price-fixing is enough to require
that it be condemned as an unlawful restraint. . ."
It seems fair to infer that the Sealy decision has not foreclosed the
possibility that a market division, in the absence of a price-fixing
scheme, may be upheld under a rule of reason approach." Indeed,
Sealy itself suggests a fact situation which may be validated if pre-
sented to the Court:
It is argued ... that a number of small grocers might allocate
territory among themselves on an exclusive basis as incident
to the use of a common name and common advertisements,
and that this sort of venture should be welcomed in the in-
terests of competition, and should not be condemned as per se
unlawful. But condemnation of appellee's territorial arrange-
ments certainly does not require us to go so far as to condemn
that quite different situation, whatever might be the result if
it were presented to us for decision.41
It is submitted that if allocation by competitors of exclusive territories
is a per se violation of the Sherman Act, there should have been no
doubt in the Court's mind that the hypothesized practices of the small
grocers would be per se illegal. Implicit in the Court's hypothetical,
then, is the idea that there might be some cases in which market
as Trade Cas. 71,258 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
S8 388 U.S. at 355-57.
40
 Richard McLaren, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
suggests that the significance of Sealy is that the Court failed to discard the ancillary re-
straints doctrine in the licensing of capital assets such as trademarks. He concludes that,
absent price fixing, selling restrictions in manufacturing-type licenses are still "arguably
defensible." McLaren, supra note 8, at 142.
41 388 U.S. at 357.
1246
CASE NOTE
divisions are permissible. More specifically, the Court's underscoring
of the price-fixing scheme in Sealy, and its hypothetical concerning
"small grocers," implies that "small" businesses which divide markets
without fixing prices, 42
 for the purpose , of promoting competition, may
be judged under a rule of reason.
It seems strange that Topco did not accept the apparent invitation
of Sealy to apply a rule of reason to the "right" market division case.
Instead, the Court relied upon Sandura Co. v. FTC," a case which not
only lacked the similarity of fact present in Sealy," but which had
been narrowly limited, if not overruled, by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.45 Both Sandura and
Schwinn were concerned with the legality of a manufacturer's allocation
of exclusive territories to its distributors rather than the horizontal
agreement by the "distributors" themselves which characterized
Topco and Sealy. Sandura and Schwinn, then, were concerned with the
legality of vertically imposed market divisions—the legality of which
prior to Schwinn had never been established by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's first occasion to rule on vertically imposed re-
straints occured in White Motor Co. v. United States," but the Court
reversed the lower court's summary judgment for the government
stating that the formulation of the applicable rule should occur only
after a trial." Sandura, decided by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, interpreted White Motor to hold that the mere demonstration
of vertically imposed territorial allocations was not sufficient to support
a finding of per se illegality." Accordingly, it proceeded to examine
the particular effects upon competition and the facts offered to justify
the restraint. Two years later, however, the Supreme Court, in Schwinn,
42 As to the possibility that the division of the market in Topco might result in
artificial price setting, see discussion at pp. 1252-54 infra.
43 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
44 In both Sealy and Topco, the licensees owned and controlled the licensor, thus
making any agreements horizontal in nature. In Sandura, however, the licensees were
mere distributors of the licensor and had no control over it, thus making the arrange-
ment vertical in nature. While both horizontal and vertically imposed market divisions
have been found illegal, the cases have recognized that the two devices may have impor-
tant differences. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
45 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
413 372 U.S. 253 (1963). In this case, the defendant, a manufacturer of trucks,
granted licenses to distributors, which licenses restricted the geographic areas within
which the distributors were permitted to sell trucks and parts. The Court reviewed the
per se and rule of reason doctrines but, noting that the case was before it on an appeal
from a summary judgment, said that it intimated no view one way or the other on the
legality of the particular arrangement before it. It felt that the applicable rule of law
should be "designed" after a trial, saying: "This is the first case involving a territorial
restriction in a vertical arrangement; and we know too little of the actual impact of .. .
that restriction ... to reach a conclusion on the bare bones of the documentary evidence
before us." 372 U.S. at 261. It should be noted, however, that the Court in White Motor
thought that the rule was well settled that horizontal market divisions are per se illegal.
372 U.S. at 263.
4T 372 U.S. at 261.
45
 399 F.2d at 849-50.
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answered the question it had left open in White Motor, and held that
vertically imposed territorial restrictions were per se unreasonable."
Despite the apparent finality of the Schwinn decision," the court in
Topco reached back to Sandura to justify its refusal to find a per se
violation. It is submitted, however, that what Topco reads as relevant
in Sandura is not its use of a rule of reason examination, but rather its
refusal to apply a per se rule where such relief would not benefit com-
petition at any level.
Sandura Company, a manufacturer of vinyl floor covering, had ac-
quired a very unfavorable reputation when imperfections appeared in
its leading product. Sales rapidly declined, and most of its distributors,
not wishing to be associated with a defective product, refused to carry
Sandura products. Finding itself on the verge of bankruptcy, Sandura
corrected the defects in its products, but encountered a continued
reluctance among distributors to finance the advertisement and promo-
tion that would be necessary to overcome Sandura's tarnished reputa-
tion, unless each distributor could be sure that it alone would reap the
benefits of such a campaign. To overcome this resistance, Sandura
offered to grant to its distributors exclusive rights to sell Sandura
products in a given territory. Numerous distributors agreed to promote
Sandura products on these terms. What impressed the court in Sandura
was the fact that if it enjoined the territorial allocations, the distribu-
tors would refuse to carry Sandura products, and Sandura, unable to
finance its own promotion and distribution, would go bankrupt." Such
a result obviously would not benefit competition in the Sandura product
line, and, moreover, the demise of Sandura would serve to lessen com-
petition in the overall floor-covering industry. The court concluded:
"We are of the opinion that on this record, the only justified conclusion
is that elimination of the closed territory arrangement would impair
competition, rather than foster it.""
Such was not the case in Schwinn. Schwinn was a healthy, com-
petitive entity which created a closed territory arrangement among its
distributors in order to maximize efficiency and compete more effec-
tively against increasing competition from imports and the growing
40 See discussion of Schwinn at note 53 infra.
00 But see Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 155 (1968), where Justice Douglas,
in his concurring opinion, intimated that a rule of reason may sometimes be applicable
to a vertically imposed division of the market: "Under our decisions the legality of ex-
clusive territorial franchises in the newspaper distribution business would have to be
tried as a factual issue. . . ." See also McLaren, supra note 8, at 144, where it is sug-
gested that the Supreme Court, in Schwinn, faced with reviewing a 23 volume record in
a short period of time, threw up its hands at the idea of even trying to make a rule of
reason analysis In that case.
51 339 F.2d at 851.
52 Id. at 859. The court considered the point that Sandura could not continue to
maintain its closed distribution system after the particular reasons justifying such a sys-
tem ceased to exist (see United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545
(E.D. Pa. 1900), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), but concluded that at the time
of the trial, the closed system was still necessary. 339 F.2d at 853.
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practice on the part of its domestic competitors to market through
mass merchandisers." The removal of the territorial restraints in
Schwinn resulted in increased competition among the various whole-
salers and retailers which carried Schwinn products, and not in an
elimination of a competitor, as would have occurred in Sandura.
The court in Topco was convinced that the Topco members would
refuse to carry Topco products without the protection of closed terri-
tories. The court thus reasoned that if it enjoined the territorial re-
straints, the result would be the disintegration of Topco Associates
and the loss of Topco private label products to competition. Recogniz-
ing that such a result would not generate competition in the Topco
products among former Topco members, and further, that by depriving
the member chains of the private label weapon, competition between
former Topco members and the national chains would decline in all
products, the court could see no point in applying the per se rule; If
one were to try to formulate the holding of Topco so as to reconcile it
with prior per se cases, it could be said that Topco does not abrogate
the per se rule against market division by competitors, but rather,
finds that rule inapplicable where the elimination of the territorial
restraints would produce a result devoid of any competitive benefits.
Implicit in this holding is the reasoning that the restraints made possi-
ble a product—Topco private label products—which had not existed
in competition prior to imposition of the restraints. Therefore, even if
competition among Topco members in this new product were restricted
by the restraints, there is at least as much competition as there was
before the imposition of the restraints when the Topco products did
not exist. And, as the court pointed out, the very existence of the Topco
private label product has actually increased competition in the overall
supermarket industry by strengthening the competitive position of the
individual Topco members. Where competition is restrained only in a
Gs Schwinn's new system of distribution included vertically imposed customer and
territorial limitations. Two kinds of customer limitations were adopted. Wholesalers were
required to sell only to approved retailers, and approved retailers were required to sell
only to consumers. Territorial restrictions were imposed upon all wholesalers. The dis-
trict court upheld the customer restrictions on both retailers and wholesalers, and the
territorial restrictions imposed on wholesalers operating under either a consignment or
agency distribution plan, but held the territorial restraints to be per se illegal when im-
posed upon wholesalers who were purchasers. Schwinn did not appeal the decision that
the territorial restrictions on purchasers were illegal per se. The government appealed the
district court's holding that Schwinn's territorial restrictions on agents and all of its cus-
tomer limitations were legal. The Supreme Court held that Schwinn's customer limitations
were illegal per se when imposed on the resale of products which the wholesalers and
retailers had purchased. The Court, however, treated the customer and territorial restric-
tions imposed on agents and consignees under a rule of reason and found them valid.
Thus, Schwinn's per se rule at the Supreme Court level technically is limited to vertically
imposed customer limitations on purchasers. The Court did, however, indicate its accep-
tance of the district court's holding that the vertically imposed territorial limitations on
purchasers were per se illegal. 388 C.S. at 379. For a general discussion of Schwinn, see
Comment, Restricted Distribution After "Schwinn," 9 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1032
(1968).
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product or group of products which can exist only as a result of the
restraints, it would seem pointless to apply a per se rule of illegality. On
the other hand, this is not to say that the arrangement is per se legal,
but rather, that the court should examine the need, reasonableness and
pro-competitive results of the restraints—in short, the court should use
a rule of reason approach. Because of the sui generis nature of the
private label program in the supermarket industry, such an approach
should not have a deleterious effect on the general per se illegality of
market division by competitors.
The soundness of the court's holding, however, depends upon the
resolution of several factors not fully explored in the opinion. Of utmost
importance is the validity of the court's finding that territorial restric-
tions were in fact necessary to the continued existence of Topco. The
determination of this crucial issue is one of the weakest points of the
case. In the first place, the only evidence that the Topco members
would have refused to maintain the Topco structure comes from the
members' own testimony." In light of the self-serving nature of this
testimony, its validity must be thoroughly investigated. Similar testi-
mony was offered in Sandura, but there the court found that the entire
record supported the proposition that the distributors would be unwill-
ing to undertake to spend the money necessary to resurrect the tar-
nished Sandura name if the final sales could be made by another
distributor." The record in Topco is not so clear on this point. First,
it does not appear what the costs of promotion would include. There
is no problem here of a bad reputation; therefore, no extraordinary
promotional expenses would seem necessary. Given the fact that the
members have a product which they are able to obtain at a relatively
low price, the force of their advertising could be directed to the price
factor rather than to the quality of the product itself. The results
obviously would not be as good as they would be if both price and
quality were extensively promoted, but there would still be some benefit,
and, therefore, reason to continue to carry the Topco products. The
argument that another Topco member in the same territory would
unfairly reap the rewards of his competitor's advertising would not
hold true if price were the focus of the advertising because each mem-
ber would set its own prices.
Even if it were true that substantial promotional expenditures
aimed at quality would be required to capture customers, it is not clear
why the individual members would necessarily have to bear this cost.
It might be argued that if Topco Associates can provide extensive
central procurement and quality control for each member," it should 
64
 The government offered no live witnesses. Its evidence consisted of documents
from Topco Associates and several newspaper clippings. In defense, Topco offered the
oral testimony of its vice president and general manager, the executives of six of its
members, and two experts in supermarket merchandising—all of whom testified as to the
importance of exclusivity to private label programs. 319 F. Supp. at 1040.
55 339 F.2d at 856.
55
 319 F. Supp. at 1032.
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also be able to finance central advertising." Whether such a course
was practical should have been investigated in more detail. It is submit-
ted, however, that a plan of central advertising would probably be
unfeasible in the Topco situation. It seems certain, for example, that
difficulties would arise in seeking to insure that each member received
an equal benefit from the advertising. An advertisement in a nationally
circulated newspaper, for instance, would benefit chains in the larger
cities where such newspapers are more likely to be available and read,
but would be of little value in an area where only local newspapers are
read. In general, it would seem that each member would be best able to
recognize and use the appropriate media for its advertising. However,
since the possibility of an alternate plan for financing the development
of Topco products would have seriously undercut the members' argu-
ment of necessity," this aspect should have been examined more
thoroughly by the Topco court.
Another factor important in an analysis of the Topco arrangement
is the determination of the relevant product market. Although the
court examined both the Topco private label brands, on the one hand,
and all supermarket products, regardless of brand, on the other, it in
effect concluded that the latter was the more important." The court,
however, should have considered more fully a third arguably relevant
product market—non-Topco products sold in Topco stores. Although
Topco members were precluded from selling Topco products in another
member's territory, they were not prohibited from opening a store in
that area and selling non-Topco products. The court noted that on
some occasions, Topco members who desired to expand into adjacent
territories cancelled their plans when they were denied permission to
sell Topco products in those areas; on the other hand, the court found
that others expanded despite the membership agreement and operated
without the Topco private labels." It is submitted, however, that the
question of whether competition was lessened in non-Topco products
is not resolved merely by examining the cases where Topco chains did
attempt to expand into other territories. What is more significant is the
number of Topco members who, because they recognized the need for
maintaining the closed territories, never even attempted to expand into
another member's territory, but chose to expand, if at all, into an un-
claimed territory where they could employ the private label program.
Since this course of action is most consistent with the inherent purpose
of the Topco organization, it is submitted that de novo entry into the
57 In Sandura, the financial status of Sandura precluded the company from conduct-
ing a promotional campaign. In Sealy, the central organization provided common adver-
tising, but the Court did not discuss this aspect of the case.
58
 The court said:
Whatever anti-competitive effect these practices may have on competition in the
sale of Topco private label brands is far outweighed by the increased ability of
Topco members to compete with the national chains and other supermarkets op-
erating in their respective territories.
59 319 F. Supp. at 1037.
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various geographic markets was discouraged to a greater degree than
the court was willing to recognize. To the extent that there was a
voluntary avoidance of expansion into other members' territories, the
Topco system resulted in a de facto lessening of competition in all non-
Topco products.
The significance of this effect, however, is diminished in those
areas where there are already numerous other supermarkets because
non-Topco products there are already in competition. The parties to
an agreement dividing a market can "gain only if the result is to give
each a substantial degree of power in his own market."' The signifi-
cance is further attenuated when one considers that although Topco
private label products account for only six percent of the average mem-
ber's sales,61
 the preference for these products that brings a customer
into a Topco store is likely to result in his remaining in the store to
complete his purchase of non-Topco products. Thus, even if there were
another Topco store in the area, the competition would be between the
Topco private label products of each, and not the non-Topco products.
Indeed, it is this potential to acquire a "total" customer that enhances
the competitive position of the Topco member vis-à-vis the national
chain. If the Topco member can convince a customer that Topco
private label products are better buys than those of its competitor, the
Topco member is also likely to win the battle to sell non-private label
products.
A final observation, directly related to the monopoly factor, con-
cerns the court's treatment of the pricing policies of the Topco mem-
bers. The court found that each member priced merchandise as it
desired, and it was apparently satisfied that there was no agreement
to fix prices.0
 This finding removed the case from the application of the
per se rule against price-fixing agreements set forth in United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co.," but it did not exclude the possibility that a
market division's inherent potential for artificial price maintenance"
might run afoul of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co." This
latter case held that interference with the free setting of prices by
normal market forces is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Although
the court in Topco did not deal with this consideration, it is submitted
that Topco can be distinguished from Socony-Vacuum. In that case, a
group of major oil companies was convicted
 of combining to stabilize 
60
 See Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws, at 26 (1955).
61
 319 F. Supp. at 1033.
62 319 F. Supp. at 1037.
68
 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
64
 The potential for artificial price maintenance stems from the possibility that as
a result of a market division, a competitor may acquire a monopoly in a particular
geographic market. The price it then assigns to its products will be artificial in the sense
that the price will not depend upon free market forces.
68
 310 U.S. 150 (1940). For an excellent discussion of Socony-Vacuum, see Rahl,




and raise gasoline prices by buying excess supplies of "distress" gaso-
line from independents." The defendants tried to distinguish their
case from Trenton Potteries on the ground that they had made no
agreement to set prices. The Court, however, held that the price-fixing
rule is not limited to the direct setting of market prices, but applies to
any kind of arrangement intended to affect prices." The required intent
was not difficult to perceive in Socony -Vacuum since there was no other
practical purpose for buying up the distress supplies. The element of
intent is not at all observable in Topco. Here the defendant's intent
was to make possible a private label program so that smaller chains
could meet the larger national chains on their own grounds. Far from
attempting to alter artificially the market prices, Topco's system would
facilitate the free market's setting of prices by providing significant
competition to the large, pace-setting national chains.
Absent an agreement to set prices, and absent an intent to affect
prices, it can be argued that the court should examine the effect of
defendant's practices on prices. This was done to some extent in United
States v. Container Corp. of America." In that case, it was alleged
that the defendants altered market prices by their practice of ex-
changing price information. The Court apparently did not find an
intent to fix prices, but it did find such an effect and held the practice
illegal." The anti-competitive effects of the market division agreement
in Topco are not as evident as those in Container. The argument that
Topco's monopoly in its private label products allows it to set prices
without regard for competition is not accurate. The Topco private label
product is in competition with the corresponding private label products
of the national chains. This is not the type of monopoly where the
"product" is available from only one source. Lettuce, for example, is
sold by both Topco and the national chains. Each, however, has a
monopoly in the brand name it puts on its lettuce. Thus, the price
of the one acts as a limit beyond which the other cannot be priced
without a probability that customers will change their preference for
private labels. In the case of competition between a Topco member
60
 The defendants thereby prevented the gasoline from being dumped on the market
at "distress" prices; which would depress the entire market. 310 U.S. at 171.
87 310 U.S. at 223-24. See Rahl, supra note 65, at 141. See also American Col-
umn & Lumber Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 377 (1921), where an agreement to exchange
price information was found illegal because the purpose was to raise prices; and Maple
Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925), where a similar agreement
was upheld because no purpose to affect prices was found.
68
 393 U.S. 333 (1969). See Comment, Price Exchange Agreements: Moving Toward
a Per Se Rule, II B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 319 (1970); Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55
Cornell L. Rev. 161, 171-78 (1970).
68
 The lower court found neither a purpose to affect prices nor such an effect. United
States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 60-61 (M.D.N.C. 1967). The
Supreme Court was silent on the purpose issue but found that the agreement had in fact
affected prices: "The inferences are irresistible that the exchange of price information has
had an anticompetitive effect in the industry, chilling the vigor of price competition." 393
U.S. at 337.
1253
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
and a national chain, it is submitted that the prices of the latter's
private label products are likely to be sufficiently low to eliminate
effectively any opportunity for artificial price setting in the Topco
products. On the contrary, the presence of the Topco private label
product probably served to diminish the national chain's ability to
take undue advantage of its own private label monopoly. In essence,
the argument for the preservation of Topco's monopoly is that it
lessens the overall oligopolistic nature of the supermarket industry
by increasing the number of strong firms. Topco's success in this en-
deavor will further encourage other small grocers and chains to form
associations to take advantage of the private label weapon and thus
open the market to an even greater degree.
However, even if an effect upon prices could be shown, it is sub-
mitted that Topco should prevail on the grounds that a slight artificial-
ity in the prices of Topco products is not too high a price to pay to
offset the competitive advantages of the national chains' legal private
label monopolies." The court appeared to recognize this when it
stressed the point that "if Topco, rather than being a buying organiza-
tion for smaller local and regional chains, were a single, large national
chain, none of its practices would be objectionable under the antitrust
laws."' Carrying this proposition to its logical conclusion, the Topco
members would be able to obtain the full advantages of a private label
program only by merging into a single company. Such a course of ac-
tion, however, would be clearly incompatible with one of the recognized
purposes of the antitrust laws—to promote the economic health of
many small and independent businesses." Topco's arrangement treads
a middle ground. It provides the private label monopoly that only a
merger could produce, and yet insures the basic independence of its
respective members. If one also considers the fact that membership
in the association is generally only temporary, it seems fair to conclude
that little in the way of competition in the private label product market
70
 The notion that an otherwise illegal, restrictive practice is valid if it offsets the
competitive advantages enjoyed by rivals was, however, specifically rejected in Schwinn:
[T]his argument, [that competitive restraints should be allowed to offset the ad-
vantages enjoyed by larger, integrated rivals], appealing as it is, is not enough
to avoid the Sherman Act proscription; because, in a sense, every restrictive prac-
tice is designed to augment the profit and competitive position of its participants.
338 U.S. at 375. But in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court indicated that a
merger of two small companies to enable them to compete with larger corporations domi-
nating the market may be valid, even though a merger between a large and small firm
or two large firms, foreclosing an identical share of the market, may be invalid. 370 U.S.
294, 331 (1962).
71 319 F. Supp. at 1040. The government had conceded this point.
72
 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America where Judge Learned Hand said
of the antitrust laws:
Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed that one
of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of
possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively
compete with each other.
148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
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has been sacrificed to effect a significant gain in competition in the
overall supermarket industry.
The government is adamant that the Topco court has erred
in not applying a per se rule." Accordingly, it has filed a jurisdic-
tional statement with the Supreme Court." The manner in which the
Supreme Court disposes of the case will have a significant effect upon
future antitrust cases in the supermarket industry and other product
markets having similar characteristics. If the Court reverses and finds
a per se violation, the government will have weathered the doubts
raised by the Sealy case, and will be relieved of the difficult task of
marshalling evidence to prove the unreasonableness of such restraints.
On the other hand, if the Court affirms the decision, or reverses because
it reads the evidence to show a clear case of unreasonableness, the
government will face the unpleasant prospect of litigating the all-too-
difficult question of reasonableness. This burden would be weighty
even if the holding were limited'to factual settings similar to that found
in Topco. It is submitted, however, that the final disposition should
rest on the merits of the case rather than on the government's burden
of enforcement.
The issue is not whether to do away with the per se rule in market
division cases, but rather, whether a decision should be made to exempt
certain situations from its application. In this regard, the principle
articulated in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States " is particularly
appropriate: "Realities must dominate the judgment.'"° There are
exceptions to all rules, and a blind adherence to a general rule without
an occasional pause to reexamine the applicability of that rule to
changing conditions runs the risk of overlooking realities.
TIMOTHY E. KISH
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Secondary Boy-
cotts—Construction Industry—NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Engi-
neers (Burns and Roe, Inc.) 1—Burns and Roe, Inc. (Burns), the
general contractor for the construction of a nuclear power generator,
subconstracted all of the construction work to three companies; White
Construction Co. (White), Chicago Bridge and Iron Co. (Chicago
Bridge), and Poirier and McClane Corp. (Poirier). All three companies
employed operating engineers who were members of Local 825. How-
ever, White was the only contractor who did not have a collective
7a The Justice Department believes that the decision in Topco effectively overrules
70 years of Supreme Court decisions. BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep., No. 501, at
A-2.
74 39 U.S.L.W. 3362 (Feb. 23, 1971).
75 288 U.S. 344 (1932).
76
 Id. at 360.
1 400 U.S. 297 (1971).
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